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France-DO-DO Azienda Directories
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Azienda News:
- Preventive regulation and corporate financialization: Evidence from . . .
The CSRC's random inspection can reduce the financialization behavior of entity enterprises driven by the reservoir motive through the resource effect, and guide firms to focus on long-term value-creating activities
- CSRC’s random inspection and capital market information efficiency: an . . .
This paper studies how the random inspection system influences capital market information efficiency by investigating the impact and mechanisms of the CSRC’s random inspection on stock price synchronicity
- The real effect of CSRCs random inspections on corporate financial . . .
Performing a multi-period synthetic difference-in-differences model (SDID), we first find that the random inspections of CSRC have a positive causal effect on the probability of exposing corporate financial fraud
- Introduction to On-site Inspection and Random Sampling Data of A-Share . . .
Since 2016, CSRC has implemented on-site inspection and random sampling of listed companies, requiring various provinces and cities with independent planning status to conduct random sampling to strengthen preventive regulation
- CSRC’s Random Inspections and Standard Operations of Listed Companies
The random inspection regime has been improving the efficiency of the public enforcement mechanism for market supervision This paper focuses on capital market regulation and examines the impact of CSRC’s random inspections on the standard operations of listed companies
- 随机监管与公司资本市场表现——基于证监会双随机检查的证据
结果显示,随机监管整体上降低了上市公司的股票流动性,较好的公司内部治理和较强的外部市场监督可以显著抑制随机监管对股票流动性的降低效应,公司的盈余管理动机则会增强该效应。 渠道检验表明,随机监管通过提升公司整体风险、降低信息披露质量和提升知情人交易概率,最终降低公司股票流动性。 本文发现了随机监管制度对资本市场表现的未预期影响,进一步佐证了考察制度实施效果的必要性。
- Randomized Inspection and Investment-Price Sensitivity: A . . . - SSRN
The CSRC’s random inspection enhances the investment-price sensitivity by increasing the share price informativeness The effect of CSRC’s random inspections on investment-price sensitivity is more pronounced among firms with poorer information quality, higher agency costs, and state-owned firms
- Administrative audit regulation and the quality of accounting . . .
Based on the “double random” inspection system implemented by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) on accounting firms, our study uses staggered DID method to examine the effect of administrative audit regulation on the quality of corporate accounting information
- CSRC’s random inspection and capital market information eff. . . : Ingenta . . .
This study enriches the literature on the consequences of random inspections and extends our knowledge of the relationship between regulatory innovations and the information efficiency of the capital market
- Full article: CSRC’s supervision and corporate investment efficiency . . .
CSRC’s random inspection will improve corporate investment efficiency by improving accounting information quality and reducing information asymmetry First, CSRC workers will directly check the accounting information of inspected firms, which will improve the quality of accounting information
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